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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Chenthilkumaran Senathirajah appeals the decision of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA" or the "Board") 
denying his petition for review of an immigration judge's 
ruling denying his application for asylum and withholding 
of deportation under 8 U.S.C. SS 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(a) and 
1253(h). For the reasons that follow we will grant the 
petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.1 
 
I. 
 
Senathirajah is a fifty-one year old ethnic Tamil from Sri 
Lanka who claims to have been tortured while detained by 
the Indian Peace Keeping Forces ("IPKF "), the Sri Lankan 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have jurisdiction to review the BIA's final order pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. S 1105(a)(1), as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009. The IIRIRA repeals relevant portions of S 1105 and 
replaces them with a new judicial review section codified at 8 U.S.C. 
S 1252, et seq. However, this amendment does not apply here, as the 
order that Senathirajah appeals was entered before September 30, 1996. 
See Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1059 n.1 (3d Cir. 1997). For 
simplicity, we will refer to the Immigration and Nationality Act as it 
existed prior to amendment. 
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military and the Sri Lankan police.2 His claims include: (1) 
a two year period of detention and torture beginning with 
an arrest by the IPKF in March 1988 for suspected 
membership in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam ("LTTE" 
or "Tigers"); (2) detention and torture by the Sri Lankan 
army beginning with an arrest in July 1992 for suspected 
membership in the LTTE; and (3) detention and physical 
abuse by the Sri Lankan police beginning with an arrest in 
January 1994 for suspicion of membership in the LTTE. 
 
Soon after the last detention alleged by Senathirajah, he 
hired "an agent" to procure a Canadian passport for him to 
travel outside of Sri Lanka. App. at 322. On February 2, 
1995, Senathirajah arrived at Kennedy Airport in New York 
where he signed a sworn statement before an Immigration 
and Naturalization Service ("INS") inspector regarding his 
attempted entry into the United States (the "affidavit"). The 
affidavit, which is transcribed in hand-printed, question 
and answer format contains the following: 
 
       Q: What is your level of education? Do you work? 
 
       A: I graduated college, I am a teacher-I teach English. 
 
       Q: Sir, have you answered all my questions truthfu lly? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Would it be a burden if you had to leave/return  to 
       Sri Lanka at this time? 
 
       A: My house was burned by the Sri Lankan army and 
       I am coming for political asylum in Canada. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Q: Sir, do you wish to add to this statement at th is 
       time? 
 
       A: No, only that I want political asylum in Canada. 
 
       Q: Sir, at this time you appear excludable . . . Y ou can 
       withdraw you[r] application to enter the U.S. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 1998), we discussed 
at some length recent Sri Lankan history; therefore, we decline to do so 
again here. 
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       voluntarily or you can ask for an exclusion hearing at 
       a later date. Which do you choose? 
 
       A: I want to go to Canada, I cannot go back. 
 
App. at 227. The INS subsequently charged Senathirajah 
with excludability from the United States, under 8 U.S.C. 
SS 1182(a)(7)(A)(I)(I) and 1182(a)(6)(C)(I) for attempting to 
enter the United States by fraud and without a valid visa.3 
App. at 357. 
 
On May 1, 1995, Senathirajah submitted a formal 
application for asylum using INS Form I-589. That form 
contains the following: 
 
       1. Why are you seeking asylum? 
 
       If I returned to Sri Lanka, I will be arrested, detained, 
       tortured and be killed. 
 
       2. What do you think would happen to you if you 
       returned to the country from which you are claiming 
       persecution? 
 
       Due to my Tamil nationality and the suspicion that I 
       am a member of the LTTE and from Velvettithurai, if I 
       were returned to Sri Lanka, I will be persecuted. 
 
App. at 317. In a statement that Senathirajah attached to 
the application he stated: 
 
       1. I was born in Velvettithurai in the northern pr ovince 
       of Sri Lanka on the 26th of December 1947. I 
       completed my secondary education in 1968. After 
       working full time for a while, I studied full time from 
       1974 to 1977 at a technical college and obtained a 
       diploma in English. 
 
       *** 
 
       4. Since 1983, the Sri Lankan government has been 
       engaged in armed conflict with Tamil militants. In May 
       1987, the Sri Lankan armed forces launched a major 
       offensive in Velvettithurai . . . . During this offensive, 
       the Sri Lankan government engaged in indiscriminate 
       bombing. During one of the Sri Lanka government's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Senathirajah's attorney has conceded excludability. App. at 160. 
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       bombing raids, the boat yard where I worked was 
       damaged severely. As a result, I left the village with my 
       family and moved to another village. 
 
       5. In August 1987, pursuant to the Indo-Sri Lankan 
       Accord, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) came to 
       Sri Lanka to restore peace and normalcy. When the 
       IPKF arrived, the Sri Lankan armed forces were 
       confined to barracks. I returned to my village with my 
       family. 
 
       6. In October 1987, war broke out between the IPKF 
       and the LTTE. . . . 
 
       8. In March 1988, during a meeting of our communit y 
       center, the members of the IPKF came to our center 
       and arrested the Secretary and myself. We were taken 
       to the IPKF camp. 
 
       9. At the camp, we were asked about the whereabout s 
       of LTTE members. We denied any knowledge about the 
       LTTE. The next day we were subjected to an 
       identification parade. A man with a black mask was 
       brought in. We were brought in front of the man with 
       a black mask and the IPKF man asked the informant 
       whether we were LTTE members. When certain persons 
       were brought in front of the informant, he nodded his 
       head. When it was my turn, the informant nodded his 
       head. I was taken away, put in solitary confinement 
       and subjected to torture. 
 
       10. I was detained by the IPKF until its departure. 
       Following talks between the Sri Lankan government 
       and the LTTE, the IPKF left Sri Lanka. 
 
       11. . . . . In June 1991, war broke out between th e Sri 
       Lankan government and the LTTE. 
 
       12. . . . . In July 1992 . . . the Sri Lankan army 
       captured our town. The LTTE cadres left my village 
       when the Sri Lankan armed forces raided the area. 
 
       13. Around 10 p.m., the Sri Lankan military came t o 
       my house. When they entered my house, they hit me 
       with their guns and accused me of being a Tiger and 
       arrested me. I was taken to their camp. 
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       14. At the camp, I was accused of being a member o f 
       the LTTE. They wanted to know the whereabouts of 
       LTTE members. When I said I didn't know, they 
       tortured me. I was detained and continually tortured 
       till October 1993. . . . 
 
       17. In January 1994, the Sri Lankan armed forces 
       raided my lodge [in Colombo]. When the Sri Lankan 
       armed forces came to my room, they asked for my 
       identification card. Upon seeing my card, they realized 
       that I was from the northern province. They 
       immediately accused me of being a Tiger and arrested 
       me. 
 
       18. I was first taken to the police station wher e I was 
       interrogated and tortured. . . . 
 
       20. Because I feared I would be arrested again, I 
       decided to leave Sri Lanka. 
 
App. at 321-22. 
 
Senathirajah had an asylum hearing on August 10, 1995. 
During that hearing, he testified to enduring atrocities 
similar to those set forth in the above statement, with some 
additions. He testified that his house had been 
"demolished" by the Sri Lankan military, that from 1988 to 
1990 he was detained by the IPKF, denied proper food and 
forced to wear the same clothing. App. at 191, 197-98. He 
also testified that he had been arrested by the Sri Lankan 
military in 1992 when the military came to his home and 
accused him of being a member of the LTTE. He stated that 
he was taken to a military camp where he underwent 
torture that included having both hands tied behind his 
back, being slapped, and being hit on the head with a bat. 
He said members of the military made him undress and 
drink his own urine whenever he asked for water. App. at 
179-80. Senathirajah also testified about an arrest in 
January 1994 in Colombo where he had gone for medical 
treatment. App. at 180-183. 
 
When asked about his fluency in English, as suggested 
by the averments in his affidavit, Senathirajah replied 
"yeah, some, little English." However, he added 
"pronunciations" of foreigners "is a little difficult." App. at 
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192. He then stated that he had requested a Tamil 
interpreter at the time of his airport interview, but was told 
that none was available. Therefore, he proceeded to give the 
statement without an interpreter. 
 
Senathirajah testified at his hearing that he signed the 
affidavit because he was "scared." He stated that "[t]he 
officer told me to sign. The two people the agent brought 
were (indiscernible) to sign the document, so I thought if I 
sign also, I'll get released. With that intention I signed." 
App. at 193. Senathirajah then insisted that he had been 
unaware of the contents of the statement before he signed 
it. Id. 
 
The immigration judge denied Senathirajah's application 
for asylum. We will quote her explanation for doing so at 
length because her reasoning is at the heart of our inquiry. 
 
       I have observed the demeanor and testimony of the 
       Applicant, and for the following reasons, I find that his 
       testimony is not credible. 1) the Applicant has testified 
       that he was arrested on three different occasions, the 
       first time being for a period of two years, the second 
       time for a period of approximately a year and three 
       months, and on the third occasion for a period of a 
       year. He stated that the date of the employment as 
       regards his tutoring profession was indicated in the 
       Form I-589 as that being from January 1978 until 
       October 1993 because he had off and on been involved 
       in this profession for those years. However, it should 
       be noted the end date of the employment as a tutor as 
       indicated on the Form I-589 (the asylum application), 
       part E is that of October 1993. In fact, Applicant has 
       stated that he was jailed from July 1992 until October 
       1993. 2) The Applicant has indicated both on direct 
       examination and, although there was some confusion 
       as to his testimony on cross examination, the 
       Applicant had testified that he was in detention from 
       March of 1988 to March of 1990 by the IPKF. However, 
       it was only on redirect and upon specific questioning 
       by the Court that the Applicant testified that in 
       February of 1989, he was, in fact, for a period of one 
       month released from the IPKF. He stated that it was by 
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       agreement, not physical force,4 that he then returned 
       back to the IPKF, and that he was then detained up 
       until March of 1990. There was absolutely no 
       testimony on direct or cross examination as to this 
       fact. 3) Although on direct examination the Applicant 
       stated that he was first arrested in March of 1988, 
       second arrested in July of 1992 and third arrested in 
       January of 1994, on cross examination, the Applicant 
       testified that the next time after his detention with the 
       IPKF that he had problems in Sri Lanka was in 
       January of 1994. It should also be noted that on direct 
       examination, the Applicant testified that he knew"little 
       English" and that he had requested that a Tamil 
       interpreter be provided for the questioning by the 
       inspector. While it may be true that the Applicant may 
       have had some difficulty in understanding the "foreign" 
       pronunciation, the response that he knew "little 
       English" is in direct contradiction to his written 
       application in the Form I-589 . . . where he indicates 
       "I am fluent in English." Further, he testified that he 
       has a degree in the English language, and that in fact 
       he had worked as an English tutor for a period that 
       covers over fifteen years. . . . 
 
Immigration Judge Opn. at 10-12. 
 
Then, in an explanation that is nothing short of 
astounding for reasons we detail below, the immigration 
judge further stated that even if she were to take 
Senathirajah's claims as true, she would still find him 
ineligible for relief because his suspected membership in 
the Tigers, a purported violent group, is valid reason for the 
government of Sri Lanka to investigate him. Id. at 13. The 
Judge stated "[i]nvestigations as to the criminal conduct of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Senathirajah's actual testimony was that he was told that if he did not 
return within a specified time after making funeral arrangements, his 
captors told him they would "come and take me. I am the person who 
has to do the funeral rights. That's why the village people spoke with the 
officer, and the officer released me" subject to the threat of forceful 
recapture if he did not return. App. at 219. Thus, the immigration 
judge's characterization of Senathirajah's release and return as "by 
agreement" is a misleading account of what he actually said. 
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the Tigers is a valid Governmental investigation, and not 
persecution." Id. at 12. 
 
The immigration judge was also influenced by 
Senathirajah's failure to corroborate his testimony other 
than by providing background materials on the conflict in 
Sri Lanka, and by what she characterized as a failure to 
provide detailed accounts of the abuse that he alleged. She 
noted that Senathirajah's affidavit did not include any 
discussion of the periods of detention that he testified to at 
his asylum hearing. 
 
        Furthermore, the Applicant has not provided any 
       corroboration in support of his testimony other than 
       generalized background materials. It is also very 
       troubling to this Court that the Applicant in relaying 
       the three occasions that he was arrested and detained 
       has not relayed in any detailed manner the alleged 
       assaults and tortures. While he did mention that 
       various acts took place, there was not a detailed 
       account. It should also be noted that in the sworn 
       statement taken at the airport the Applicant made 
       absolutely no mention of the three periods of detention 
       which allegedly was for a period of over four years. In 
       fact, during today's hearing, the Applicant stated that 
       he relayed to the inspector that he had come to the 
       United States because his work place as well as his 
       home was destroyed, but he did not testify that he had 
       relayed any other information as to his detention to the 
       inspector. 
 
Id. at 13. 
 
The immigration judge ruled that Senathirajah had failed 
to satisfy his burden as to both his asylum claim and as to 
his withholding of deportation claim. The judge also found 
that he had not met his burden of proof under the fraud 
component of S 212(a)(6)(C)(I), since she determined that 
Senathirajah had given a false name (Chenthilkumaran  
Senathirajah)5 to the INS inspector at Kennedy Airport, and 
he signed the affidavit using the assumed name. 
Accordingly, the judge ordered Senathirajah excluded and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Petitioner's real name is Sittampalam Sundralingam. 
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deported from the United States pursuant to 
SS 212(a)(7)(A)(I)(I) and 212(A)(6)(C)(I) of the Immigration Act. 
 
The BIA affirmed the immigration judge's decision. 6 The 
Board stated "[w]e do not ordinarily disturb an immigration 
judge's credibility finding, and give an immigration judge's 
credibility finding significant weight." BIA Opn. at 2 (citing 
Matter of V-T-S-, Interim Decision 3308 at 7 (BIA 1997); see 
Matter of Burbano, 20 I & N Dec. 872 (BIA 1994). However, 
although the BIA affirmed the immigration judge, it 
expressed concern over the judge's credibility determination 
as the BIA found that Senathirajah sufficiently explained 
some of the testimony that caused the judge to doubt his 
credibility. Nonetheless, the BIA concluded that the 
immigration judge "had substantial grounds for being 
unwilling to credit the applicant's account of the events 
that form the basis of his claim." Id. The Board was 
particularly troubled with Senathirajah's professed difficulty 
with English. The Board stated: 
 
       [w]e agree with the immigration judge's assessment of 
       the applicant's claim not to have understood the 
       pronunciation of the English-speaking Service officer 
       who examined him upon his attempted entry into the 
       United States. In this regard we observe that the 
       applicant testified that he studied English at the 
       college level (citation omitted). We also observe that in 
       his Application for Asylum and for Withholding of 
       Deportation . . . the applicant indicates that he is 
       fluent in English. 
 
BIA Opn. at 2. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. On October 19, 1995, Petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Appeal, 
stating that the INS had agreed to parole him to Canada where he would 
be granted asylum and where he had relatives. App. at 104. On 
December 15, 1995, the BIA acknowledged by order that Senathirajah's 
appeal was withdrawn. App. at 103. On March 21, 1996, Petitioner filed 
a Motion to Reopen with the Immigration judge, stating that on 
December 26, 1995, the INS district director had "changed his policy of 
paroling individuals to Canada to seek asylum." App. at 91. On April 29, 
1996, the Immigration judge denied the Motion to Reopen. App. at 84- 
85. The BIA then certified the case to allow consideration of the appeal. 
App. at 2-5. 
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The BIA also stated that, despite the lack of detail of the 
questions on the sworn statement, "the harm the applicant 
claimed to have suffered, also as reflected in the sworn 
statement, is not the kind of harm that the applicant's 
testimony indicates is the basis of his application for 
asylum." Id. The Board then affirmed the decision of the 
immigration judge as it found Senathirajah "not a credible 
claimant for asylum and withholding of deportation." BIA 
Opn. at 3. This appeal followed. 
 
II. 
 
A "refugee" is defined as 
 
       any person who is outside any country of such 
       person's nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling 
       to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself 
       or herself of the protection of, that country because of 
       persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on 
       account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
       particular social group, or political opinion. 
 
8 U.S.C. S 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). In the Refugee 
Act of 1980, Congress amended the Immigration and 
Nationalization Act to include section 208(a). That section 
gave the Attorney General discretion to grant asylum to 
those who qualify as refugees. It also amended section 
243(h) so as to require that deportation be withheld if an 
alien "demonstrates a clear probability of harm on account 
of one of the enumerated factors." Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 
1055, 1061 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
       One of Congress's primary purposes in enacting the 
       1980 law was to harmonize United States law with the 
       United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
       Refugees ("U.N. Protocol"), to which the United States 
       became a party in 1968. 
 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The immigration Act 
thus requires the Attorney General to determine if an alien 
is a refugee. 8 U.S.C. S 1158 (1994). The alien has the 
burden of "show[ing] that he qualifies as a refugee . . . ." 
Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 1998). 
To qualify as a refugee, an applicant must establish" by 
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objective evidence that it is more likely than not that he or 
she will be subject to persecution upon deportation." INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987). 
 
The Attorney General must withhold deportation if the 
applicant demonstrates that upon deportation his or her 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of 
the statutorily enumerated factors. 8 U.S.C. S 1253(h); 
Chang, 119 F.3d at 1066; see also Balasubramanrim, 143 
F.3d at 164 n.10. To meet this test, the alien must 
demonstrate that there is a greater-than-fifty-percent 
chance of persecution upon his or her return. Vilorio-Lopez 
v. INS, 852 F.2d 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 1987). If the alien 
fails to establish that his or her life or freedom will be 
threatened upon return so as to require that deportation be 
withheld, the Attorney General may still exercise her 
discretion and not deport the alien by a grant of asylum 
under S 208 of the Immigration Act. The latter requires that 
the alien establish a subjective fear of persecution that is 
supported by objective evidence that persecution is a 
reasonable possibility. Chang, at 1066. 
 
It is obvious that one who escapes persecution in his or 
her own land will rarely be in a position to bring 
documentary evidence or other kinds of corroboration to 
support a subsequent claim for asylum. It is equally 
obvious that one who flees torture at home will rarely have 
the foresight or means to do so in a manner that will 
enhance the chance of prevailing in a subsequent court 
battle in a foreign land. Common sense establishes that it 
is escape and flight, not litigation and corroboration, that is 
foremost in the mind of an alien who comes to these shores 
fleeing detention, torture and persecution. Accordingly, 
corroboration is not required to establish credibility. The 
law allows one seeking refugee status to "prove his 
persecution claim with his own testimony if it is credible." 
Mosa v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 601, 604 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 
Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
Here, Senathirajah claims that the BIA's "adverse credibility 
finding is not supported by the record [or] by law." 
Petitioner's Br. at 10. We agree. 
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III. 
 
As noted above, the BIA's ruling results in substantial 
part from the deference it gave the immigration judge's 
decision. However, while affirming the immigration judge's 
conclusion as to Senathirajah's credibility, the BIA noted 
that it believed some of the immigration judge's skepticism 
was not warranted. Nevertheless, the Board affirmed the 
decision of the immigration judge even though the Board 
believed that "some of the aspects of the applicant's 
testimony with which the immigration judge had difficulty 
[were] adequately explained by the applicant." App. at 3.7 
Nevertheless, the BIA appears to have substantially relied 
upon the adverse credibility ruling of the immigration judge 
in rejecting Senathirajah's petition. The BIA may defer to 
the credibility rulings of an immigration judge who actually 
heard the testimony, and observed the witnesses. However, 
the BIA is not required to do so, and it ought not to defer 
when such deference is not supported by its own 
independent review of the record. 
 
       Where the immigration judge makes a credibility 
       determination, the Board can independently assess 
       that determination and make de novo findings on 
       credibility. See Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 
       1338 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The Board has the power to 
       review the record de novo and make its own findings of 
       fact.") 
 
Balasubramanrim, at 161. 
 
Here, although the Board did grant some deference to the 
immigration judge, it appears that the Board also 
conducted an independent examination of the record, and 
also concluded that Senathirajah was not credible. We 
must sustain the BIA's adverse credibility determination if 
there is substantial evidence in the record to support it. 
Chang, at 1060; see also Hartooni v. INS, 21 F.3d 336, 340 
(9th Cir. 1994); Cordero-Trejo v. INS, 40 F.3d 482, 487 (1st 
Cir. 1994). "Substantial evidence is more than a mere 
scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In its brief opinion, the BIA did not state to what it was referring 
when 
it made this statement. 
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mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 
Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1987). An 
immigration judge who "rejects a witness's positive 
testimony because in his or her judgment it lacks 
credibility should offer a specific, cogent reason for [his or 
her] disbelief." Turcios, 821 F.2d at 1399 (citation and 
internal quotations omitted). We "evaluate those reasons to 
determine whether they are valid grounds upon which to 
base a finding that the applicant is not credible." Vilorio- 
Lopez v. INS, 852 F.2d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing 
Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332, 1337-78 (9th Cir. 
1986)). 
 
The Board's credibility determination was based upon the 
following factors: (1) it disbelieved Senathirajah's testimony 
that he could not understand English as spoken by the INS 
inspector since Senathirajah testified that he had studied 
English at the college level and had stated on his asylum 
application that he was fluent in English; (2) Senathirajah 
did not "specifically claim that the Record of Sworn 
Statement . . . misrepresents his actual statement to the 
examining Service officer.";8 and (3) the harm that 
Senathirajah claimed that he suffered in his sworn 
statement or affidavit was not the same as that which he 
testified was the basis of his asylum application. BIA Opn. 
at 2. 
 
The circumstances of Senathirajah's petition are quite 
similar to those that were before us in Balasubramanrim. 
There, the petitioner was also a Tamil from Sri Lanka 
seeking asylum and withholding of deportation. In ruling 
upon Balasubramanrim's petition for review, we noted the 
persecution facing residents of Sri Lanka who were 
identified as being Tamil, and the historical roots of 
that oppression. See Balasubramanrim, at 159. 
Balasubramanrim "claim[ed] to have been arrested, 
detained, and tortured on several occasions by the armed 
forces of the Sri Lankan government, the Indian 
peacekeeping forces and the Liberation Tigers." 
Balasubramanrim, at 159. Balasubramanrim also claimed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. In fact, the BIA considered Petitioner's testimony as a confirmation of 
the accuracy of the sworn statement. BIA Opn. at 2. 
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that he would be subject to additional detention and torture 
if he returned to Sri Lanka because he was Tamil. On his 
application he stated that the following events occurred 
before he left Sri Lanka: 
 
       1. In March 1988, he was arrested by the Indian 
       Peacekeeping Forces and taken to a camp where he 
       was accused of being a Tiger and beaten; 
 
       2. In November 1989, he was again arrested . . . 
       because he refused to join the ranks of one of the 
       political fighting forces, was tortured for an entire day, 
       and remained in custody for five days; 
 
       3. In March 1990, the Tigers arrested him for 10 d ays 
       and accused him of being an informant for the Indian 
       Peacekeeping Forces, a charge which he claims was 
       untrue; 
 
       4. In 1991, his brother disappeared after being 
       arrested by the Sri Lankan army; 
 
       5. In 1993, his father was killed by Sri Lankan air 
       bombs; 
 
       6. In October 1993, he fled northern Sri Lanka but 
       was arrested for failing to register in the new area; 
 
       7. Also in October 1993, after accusing 
       Balasubramanrim of being a Tiger, the Sri Lankan 
       army arrested, detained and tortured him for one year 
       and ten days; eventually, his wife bribed the army for 
       his release; 
 
       8. In late 1994, Sri Lankan armed forces arrested him 
       at the airport as he was trying to leave the country 
       with his family, and he was detained and tortured for 
       four months and ten days. 
 
Id. After the `94 arrest, Balasubramanrim left Sri Lanka 
using a fake Canadian passport, ultimately arriving at 
Kennedy Airport. There, INS officials interviewed him in 
English without the aid of a translator. The result of this 
encounter was a handwritten document with 25 questions 
and answers about Balasubramanrim's past and his 
reasons for seeking asylum. 
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Thereafter, Balasubramanrim appeared before an 
immigration judge where he told of the atrocities that he 
had endured. The immigration judge found him 
"excludable, denied his application for asylum and 
withholding of deportation, and ordered him deported to Sri 
Lanka." Id. at 160. The judge concluded that 
Balasubramanrim had not been truthful about his "prior 
arrests and his fears about returning to Sri Lanka. The [ ] 
judge also expressed doubts about his credibility because 
Balasubramanrim did not look at him while testifying and 
instead stared straight ahead `as though in a trance.' " Id. 
 
The BIA affirmed the immigration judge's decision 
because of perceived inconsistencies between 
Balasubramanrim's testimony at the hearing and his 
airport statement. 
 
However, we concluded that Balasubramanrim's airport 
interview did not necessarily accurately reflect the 
persecution that he suffered in Sri Lanka, nor the danger 
he would face if he were forced to return. We expressed 
concern that: (1) the handwritten record of the airport 
interview may not be reliable since "[w]e [did] not know how 
the interview was conducted or how the document was 
prepared"; (2) the airport statement was not an application 
for asylum; (3) an arriving alien may, because of past 
interrogation, be unwilling to disclose much information to 
government officials; and (4) the BIA may not have 
accurately assessed Balasubramanrim's English skills. Id. 
at 162-63. 
 
We thus concluded that any discrepancy between 
Balasubramanrim's airport statement and his testimony 
was insufficient, by itself, to support the BIA's finding that 
the petitioner was not credible. Id. at 164 (citing Aguilera- 
Cota, 914 F.2d at 1382). We recognized that the BIA did not 
pursue Balasubramanrim's asylum and withholding of 
deportation claims because of its adverse credibility finding. 
However, " `[i]n the absence of substantial evidence 
supporting a finding of adverse credibility, the BIA is 
required explicitly to consider a petitioner's claims for 
asylum and withholding of deportation.' " Id. at 165 
(quoting Mosa, 89 F.3d at 605). 
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We therefore granted Balasubramanrim's petition and 
remanded the case to the BIA with further instruction to 
remand to the immigration judge for a determination of 
Balasubramanrim's asylum and withholding of deportation 
claims "without reliance on the adverse credibility finding." 
Id. Specifically, we held that "because of ambiguities in the 
airport statement and the circumstances under which it 
was made, that statement does not provide sufficient 
evidence to support the adverse credibility determinations 
upon which the immigration judge and BIA denied the 
petition." Id. 
 
Here, as in Balasubramanrim, the immigration judge and 
the BIA gave far too much weight to the affidavit taken 
during Senathirajah's airport interview. The government 
offered no testimony as to the circumstances under which 
that affidavit was obtained, or whether it was necessary to 
use sign language and/or gestures to communicate with 
Senathirajah. It is uncontested that he asked for an 
interpreter before he gave the affidavit and none was 
provided. As in Balasubramanrim, the affidavit here was not 
an application for asylum, and it should neither have been 
treated as such, nor read with the exacting eye that the BIA 
might use to examine statements that accompany Form I- 
589. By placing too much reliance on an airport interview 
under the circumstances here, and ignoring more detailed 
accounts in Form I-589 as well as testimony at an asylum 
hearing, the INS seriously undermined the reliability of the 
administrative process. Given Senathirajah's allegations of 
torture and detention, he may well have been reluctant to 
disclose the breadth of his suffering in Sri Lanka to a 
government official upon arriving in the United States even 
if he could understand the questions he was being asked at 
the airport. 
 
The BIA affirmed the ruling of the immigration judge 
primarily because it agreed with the judge's conclusion that 
Senathirajah was fluent in English and could therefore be 
held to the statements in the affidavit and the apparent 
inconsistencies between those statements, the averments in 
Form I-589, and his later testimony at his asylum hearing. 
However, neither the BIA nor the immigration judge 
considered the limitations of the airport interview. 
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Moreover, Form I-589 allows for only two choices when 
inquiring about an applicant's facility with English. It asked 
only if Senathirajah was fluent, with no attempt to inquire 
into various degrees of proficiency one may have with a 
foreign language.9 Furthermore, neither the BIA nor the 
immigration judge appears to have given any consideration 
to the difficulty someone from Sri Lanka may have in 
understanding "American English," particularly under the 
stressful circumstances of entry into a new country. 10 
During the asylum hearing, Senathirajah testified as 
follows: 
 
       Q: Did you complete high school? 
 
       A: Yes. 
 
       Q: Did you complete college? 
 
       A: I went to advanced level. 
 
       Q: I'm sorry, to what? 
 
       A: To advanced level, advanced level. 
 
       Q: Of college? 
 
       A: There they say college is still advanced level.  College 
       is university. They say that university. 
 
       Q: So you went to university? 
 
       A: I went for community college. 
 
       . . . . 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The asylum application asks that the applicant select one of two 
choices identifying his language facility. The application states: 
 
       17. Native Language: a. __ I am fluent  in English. 
                            b. __ I am not fluent in English, but I am 
                            fluent in Tamil. 
 
10. Sri Lanka, which until 1972 was known as Ceylon, became an 
independent nation in 1948, after almost 150 years of British colonial 
rule. Consequently, the English taught to Sri Lankans is more than 
likely not of a vernacular commonly used in the United States. It seems 
no stretch, then, to assume that Petitioner might have needed an 
interpreter even if he technically "spoke the same language" as the INS 
inspector. 
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       Q: . . . . What was your major, what was your course 
       of study? 
 
       A: Diplomat and English. 
 
App. at 195-96. Although it is not clear if Senathirajah 
meant to say that he had a "diploma" in English, or if he 
meant to say he studied "diplomacy" and English, it is clear 
that he had significant trouble in both speaking and 
understanding English during the asylum hearing. One 
cannot read the transcript from that hearing without 
realizing that there was significant difficulty communicating 
with Senathirajah even with the presence of a Tamil 
interpreter. For instance, though the immigration judge and 
BIA placed substantial reliance on Senathirajah's testimony 
that he had "tutored" English, throughout his testimony he 
continually used "tuition" for "tutor" thus illustrating far 
more significant difficulty with the language than either the 
immigration judge or the BIA realized. For example 
Senathirajah declared: 
 
        Sometimes I go to houses and give tuition to 
       students at their place. Sometime -- it's a private 
       tutoring. That's why (indiscernible). 
 
       *** 
 
       It was often I was giving tuition when I was detained. 
       Then afterwards when I come from detention then I 
       went to tuition. 
 
       *** 
 
       In the application I put total (indiscernible), but I was 
       given (indiscernible). Because the tuition work I was 
       doing was not profit. Same time I was detained, and 
       then I come back from detention, then I give tuition. 
 
App. at 60, 63. Nevertheless, when asked "are you fluent in 
English?", Senathirajah responded: "Yeah, some, little 
English." Id. at 53. It is clear from the transcript that 
whatever Senathirajah thought "fluent" meant, his facility 
with English is less than one might expect from the use of 
that term. It is clear that his ability to speak and 
understand the language is not without difficulty. 
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Senathirajah argues that "advanced levels" in the British 
educational system in Sri Lanka translates into the first 
year of undergraduate studies in the United States. Letter 
from Chin Wei Fong, Attorney for Petitioner, 5/14/98, p.2. 
The government offered no evidence at the hearing to 
establish that Senathirajah's level of education would have 
allowed him more proficiency with English than he 
admitted to. It is undisputed that Senathirajah requested 
an interpreter when he arrived at the airport but that none 
was available. Although he signed the affidavit, we are 
unimpressed with the affidavit's reliability, or probative 
value. Senathirajah's testimony that he provided the 
interview after being kept at the airport for "three or four 
hours without water or food . . . I was feeling faintish," App. 
at 54, was not rebutted. Yet, the immigration judge and the 
BIA held Senathirajah to a level of proficiency in English 
that is inconsistent with his request for an interpreter, the 
circumstances under which the affidavit was taken, or with 
the transcript of the asylum hearing. 
 
Moreover, we believe that it is irrelevant that 
Senathirajah does not assert that the affidavit 
misrepresents his actual statement at the airport. 
Senathirajah claims that the affidavit is incomplete because 
of ambiguous and incomplete questioning that did not 
effectively elicit information relevant to a subsequent claim 
for asylum and withholding of deportation. We agree. The 
following exchange is illustrative. 
 
       Q: Would it be a burden if you had to leave/depart  to 
       Sri Lanka at this time? 
 
       A: My house was burned by the Sri Lankan army and 
       I am coming for political asylum in Canada. 
 
App. at 227. The inspector's next question was:"Do you 
have any friends or relatives here in the U.S?" Id. 
Senathirajah argues that had the inspector asked a more 
precise question--perhaps a question about persecution 
rather then whether he had any relatives or friends--the 
inspector would have elicited a more complete account of 
the suffering that Senathirajah had suffered in the past and 
the likelihood of future suffering. In Balasubramanrim, we 
noted that the immigration judge also placed too much 
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reliance upon an airport interview where, after 
Balasubramanrim stated he would be killed if he returned 
home, "the next question was: `How did you get to the U.S. 
from Sri Lanka?' " Balasubramanrim, at 163. 
 
The BIA affirmed the immigration judge's credibility 
finding partly on the ground that the harm that 
Senathirajah mentioned in the affidavit (his house being 
burned) was not the same as that mentioned during his 
testimony (arrests, detentions and physical abuse). 
However, there is nothing inconsistent in those two 
responses. At the airport, Senathirajah was asked if"it 
would be a burden" to return to Sri Lanka. He responded 
that his house had been burned down. Surely, having one's 
house burned down results in a burden. Senathirajah's 
statement that his house had been burned does not negate 
his subsequent testimony that he had been tortured during 
periods of detention. His statement regarding the burning 
of his home is responsive to the question he was asked. It 
is clearly a burden for one who is homeless to have to 
return home. At the hearing, neither the government nor 
the immigration judge asked Senathirajah why he did not 
tell the INS inspector about his detention or torture in Sri 
Lanka. It is unfair to fault him for not volunteering that 
information in response to the questions the INS inspector 
asked. 
 
Similarly, the immigration judge discredited 
Senathirajah's testimony because he did not give a detailed 
account of what he had endured either during his airport 
interview or during his testimony. The judge stated: 
 
       It is also very troubling to this Court that the Applicant 
       in relaying the three occasions that he was arrested 
       and detained has not relayed in any detailed manner 
       the alleged assaults and tortures. While he did mention 
       that various acts took place, there was not a detailed 
       account. It should also be noted that in the sworn 
       statement taken at the airport the Applicant made 
       absolutely no mention of the three periods of detention 
       which allegedly was for a period of over four years. In 
       fact, during today's hearing, the Applicant stated that 
       he relayed to the inspector that he had come to the 
       United States because his work place as well as his 
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       home was destroyed, but he did not testify that he had 
       relayed any other information as to his detention to the 
       inspector. 
 
Opn. at 13. Taking these concerns in turn we again note 
that Senathirajah answered those questions he was asked 
at the hearing. He told of being forced to drink his own 
urine when he asked for water, being kicked, and beaten on 
the head with a baseball bat. If the immigration judge 
wanted greater detail she should have asked appropriate 
follow up questions that may have elicited it. Thus, the 
immigration judge and the BIA ignore the most obvious 
reason for Senathirajah's purported failure to provide 
greater detail. He was not asked. When asked about the 
details of his detention, he told of beatings, and being 
forced to drink his own urine. We do not understand what 
further detail the immigration judge expected, and we 
surely can't fault Senathirajah for not knowing. Our review 
of the affidavit reveals no question that would have elicited 
any information about detention in Sri Lanka, let alone 
torture and persecution. 
 
The immigration judge conceded that Senathirajah "may 
have had problems in understanding the oral language," 
Opn. at 12, when she discussed the answers he gave the 
INS inspector at the airport. Yet, she dismissed that 
possibility by concluding "he has signed a document. That 
is the Applicant had ample opportunity to review the 
question and answers that were written on [the affidavit]." 
Id. However, if Senathirajah did not understand the 
questions that were asked of him, it is irrelevant that he 
had time to review the response that the inspector 
attributed to him. In addition, as noted above, 
Senathirajah's testimony of the circumstances under which 
he gave the written statement remain uncontroverted. 
Finally, the immigration judge and BIA placed too much 
weight upon the fact that Senathirajah's written statement 
contained time frames that are not identical to those he 
testified to. "Minor inconsistencies in the record such as 
discrepancies in dates which reveal nothing about an 
asylum applicant's fear for his safety are not an adequate 
basis for an adverse credibility finding." Vilorio-Lopez, 852 
F.2d at 1141. For example, the immigration judge was 
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troubled by Senathirajah's testimony that he was employed 
as a "tutor" during the time he was purportedly detained. 
Yet, his testimony was that he was self-employed and 
provided "tutoring" part time, and that he resumed tutoring 
upon his release. Thus, he may have well viewed himself as 
a tutor even though he was detained. He testified:"I was 
often I was giving tuition when I was detained. Then 
afterwards when I come from detention I went to tuition." 
App. at 199. 
 
The asylum process ought to be a determination of 
whether someone is entitled to either a withholding of 
deportation, or a discretionary grant of asylum. It is a 
process that Congress has enacted, at least in part, to align 
the immigration laws of the United States with the law of 
nations. See Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 198 (3d Cir. 
1996) ("[T]he Refugee Act brought the domestic laws of the 
United States into conformity with its treaty obligations 
under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees"). The procedures for requesting asylum and 
withholding of deportation are not a search for a 
justification to deport. Justice requires that an applicant 
for asylum or withholding of deportation be afforded a 
meaningful opportunity to establish his or her claim. 
 
        Deportation is always a harsh measure; it is all the 
       more replete with danger when the alien makes a claim 
       that he or she will be subject to death or persecution 
       if forced to return to his or her home country. In 
       enacting the Refugee Act of 1980 Congress sought to 
       give the United States sufficient flexibility to respond to 
       situations involving political or religious dissidents and 
       detainees throughout the world. 
 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). We do not operate under any 
rule that prevents an asylum applicant from elaborating 
upon the circumstances underlying an asylum claim when 
given the opportunity to take the witness stand. 
 
Before concluding our discussion of the merits of 
Senathirajah's petition for review, it is necessary for us to 
clarify a misconception expressed by the immigration judge. 
As noted above, the immigration judge concluded that she 
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would deny Senathirajah's application even if he were 
credible because "[i]nvestigations as to the criminal conduct 
of the Tigers is a valid Governmental investigation, and not 
persecution." Op. at 12. Although claims of torture, without 
more, do not afford Senathirajah the relief he seeks here, 
we emphasize that torture does not constitute valid 
governmental investigation, and conduct such as beatings 
with bats, and forcing one to drink one's own urine when 
thirsty ought not to be mistaken for legitimate 
governmental investigations by any judge. 
 
       In light of the universal condemnation of torture in 
       numerous international agreements, and the 
       renunciation of torture as an instrument of official 
       policy by virtually all of the nations of the world (in 
       principle if not in practice), we find that an act of 
       torture committed by a state official against one held in 
       detention violates established norms of the 
       international law of human rights, and hence the law 
       of nations. 
 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2nd Cir,. 1980). 
See also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, General 
Assembly Resolution, 217 (III)(A)(Dec. 10, 1948) ("no one 
shall be subjected to torture"), American Convention on 
Human Rights, Art. 5, OAS Treaty Series No. 36 at 1, OAS 
Off. Rec. OEA/Ser 4 v/II 23, doc 21, rev.2. (English ed. 
1975) ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment"). The 
immigration judge's proclamation was apparently based 
upon her belief that the Tigers were a subversive 
organization and that "legitimate" forces in Sri Lanka 
therefore had a right to investigate. However, there is 
absolutely no evidence in this record that Senathirajah was 
a member of the Tigers, and even if he was, we disagree 
with the immigration judge's belief that the Sri Lankan 
government could use torture as part of its investigation 
into his activity.11 "Although torture was once a routine 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Our holding in Balasubramanrim establishes that the treatment of 
the Tamil in Sri Lanka, and the persecution that has resulted from the 
activities of the Tigers could be sufficient to support a claim for asylum 
or withholding of deportation. However, that decision was after 
Senathirajah's asylum hearing and the immigration judge here did not 
have the benefit of that discussion. 
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concomitant of criminal interrogations in many nations, 
during the modern and hopefully more enlightened era it 
has been universally renounced. According to one survey, 
torture is prohibited, expressly or implicitly, by the 
constitutions of over fifty-five nations. . . ." Pena-Irala, 630 
F.2d at 884. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the BIA 
did not have substantial evidence for its finding of adverse 
credibility. We therefore hold that the BIA erred in affirming 
the decision of the immigration judge. Thus, we will remand 
this case to the BIA with instructions that the matter be 
remanded to the immigration judge, for a ruling on 
Senathirajah's asylum and withholding of deportation 
claims without consideration of the prior adverse credibility 
findings. 
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